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Planning and Proof Planning
Erica Melis1 and Alan Bundy2
Abstract. The paper adresses proof planning as a specific AI plan-
ning. It describes some peculiarities of proof planning and discusses
some possible cross-fertilization of planning and proof planning.
1 Introduction
Planning is an established area of Artificial Intelligence (AI) whereas
proof planning introduced by Bundy in [2] still lives in its childhood.
This means that the development of proof planning needs maturing
impulses and the natural questions arise `What can proof planning
learn from its Big Brother planning?' and `What are the specific char-
acteristics of the proof planning domain that determine the answer?' .
In turn for planning, the analysis of approaches points to a need of
mature techniques for practical planning. Drummond [8], e.g., an-
alyzed approaches with the conclusion that the success of Nonlin,
SIPE, and O-Plan in practical planning can be attributed to hierar-
chical action expansion, the explicit representation of a plan's causal
structure, and a very simple form of propositional resource allocation
rather than to “precondition achievement” which is the predominant
formulation of planning in the AI community. Therefore the tech-
niques of proof planning that succeeded so far might be of interest
for other application areas and problem classes.
To provide a feeling, under which conditions approaches or tech-
niques from proof planning can be adopted for planning in realistic
environments, we discuss some important features of the proof plan-
ning domain. In order to contribute to a cross-fertilization of AI
planning and proof planning, we briefly describe lessons that can
be learned from planning or proof planning.. This paper extends a
description given in [3].
2 Proof Planning
While humans can cope with long and complex proofs and have
strategies to avoid less promising proof paths, automated theorem
proving suffers from exhaustive search in super-exponential search
spaces. Some empirical sources [19, 9] provide evidence that math-
ematicians use specific methods (e.g. diagonalization), intelligently
guide the search for proofs, and plan a proof during the proof discov-
ery process. E.g., the German mathematician Faltings, who proved
Mordell's Conjecture, described in [9] that “We know from experience
that certain inferences are usually successful under certain prerequi-
sites. So first we ponder about a reasonable way to proceed to prove
the theorem. In other words, we roughly plan: If we get a certain
result the next result will follow and then the next etc. Afterwards we
have to fill in the details, and to check whether the plan really works.”
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These insights make proof planning intriguing for interactive as well
as for automated theorem proving.
Bundy [2] and his group in Edinburgh pioneered proof planning as
a technique that can be considered AI-planning and that employs
an intelligent guidance of proofs. This work resulted in the proof
planner CLAM [22] that plans proofs by mathematical induction and
that performs little average search.
Proof planning contrast with the more local heuristics which have pre-
viously been used for search control (in automated theorem proving).
That is, instead of making separate decisions at each choice point of
proving at the (low) level of logical inferences, based on local clues,
proof planning has some sense of the overall direction of the proof.
The global search control is achieved by joining two roads, (1) the
use of tactics and (2) meta-level control:
1. As opposed to traditional automated theorem that applies calculus-
level inference rules, i.e. low level inferences, proof planning relies
on tactics [10]. Tactics are procedures that produce a (not neces-
sarily fixed) sequenceof lower level inferences when executed, for
instance a sequenceof logical inferences at the calculus-level. Pre-
viously, tactics have already been employed in several interactive
theorem provers, e.g. Nuprl [6].
In order to enable a combination of tactical theorem proving with
meta-level control, Bundy [2] introduced methods as (partial) spec-
ifications of tactics that specify in a meta-language the precondi-
tions and effects of its application3. In Figure 1 the structure of
CL
A
M ' s methods is depicted. The methods serve as planning op-
erators whose application yields the sequents from the output slot
as subgoals. These preconditions contain control knowledge.They
name: Prolog term
input: sequent H==>G, H set of hypotheses, G goal
precondition: list of conjuncts in meta-level language
postcondition: list of conjuncts in meta-level language
output: list of sequents
tactic: Prolog term
Figure 1. The method data structure in CLAM .
describe in a meta-language (1) syntactic properties of object-level
expressions (sequents and formulas) E that are subgoals or ele-
ments of the initial state (definitions or axioms) or (2) abstract
properties of these expressions that emerge from annotations to
3 Note that these preconditions and effects of the methods in CLAMdenote
things different from input and output which consist of sequents. Sequents
are of the form ∆ ` F , where ∆ is a set of formulas and F is a formula.
E. An example of the first kind of preconditions is “E has a
free variable”. An example of the second kind of preconditions is
“There is a recorded definitionR of the form (lhs -> rhs) such
that the annotated lhs matches a subexpression of the annotated
E while preserving the annotations.”
2. The meta-level control came into play by (a) recognizing common
proof plan patterns in families of proofs, for instance in proofs by
mathematical induction or in diagonalization proofs, and by (b)
discovering abstract goals and abstract heuristics that can guide
the search for proofs.
(a) Proofs by mathematical induction4reveal a common general









Figure 2. Structure of proofs by mathematical induction
find an appropriate induction schema and then to prove the con-
jecture for the base case, e.g., for n = 0, and for the step case,
where the conjecture for a “successor”of the induction variable,
e.g. of n, (called the induction conclusion) is proved provided
the conjecture for the induction variable itself (which is called
the induction hypothesis) holds. The step case pattern includes
some kind of “fertilization”, i.e., of applying the induction hy-
pothesis to a rewritten induction conclusion such that a true
formula results.
The rewriting is subject to the abstract heuristic rippling de-
scribed next.
(b) A meta-level goal in the step case is to reduce the differences
between induction conclusion and induction hypothesis in order
to enable a final fertilization. These differences are represented
by annotations, e.g., colours, to the induction conclusion. Ax-
ioms and definitions that belong to the initial state and which
can be used to reduce the differences are annotated similarly.
The abstract search heuristic for proofs by mathematical induc-
tion, rippling, was introduced by Bundy [2] and Hutter [12].
It describes a systematic way to remove the differences, for
example by moving the differences outward until the induc-
tion hypothesis can be applied to an inner part of the rewritten
induction conclusion. For example, in proving the conjecture
8x; y; z: x+ (y+ z) = (x+ y) + z (1)
4 Mathematical induction is a generalization of the well known pattern
of Peano induction over natural numbers that has the induction schema
P (0);8k(P (k)!P (k+1))
8n(P (n))
.
the induction hypothesis is
x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z (2)
and the conclusion is
s(x) + (y + z) = ( s(x) + y) + z (3)
The boxes, excluding the underlined terms, denote the differ-
ences. The non-differences are called the skeleton. Rippling
works by successively applying skeleton preserving definitions
and axioms to the induction conclusion. A definition of the
function + is
s(U) + V ) s(U + V ) (4)
where the skeleton on each side of the implication is U + V .
In this example, rippling involves the repeated application of
(4) which moves the differences outwards until the following
expression is obtained
s(x+ (y + z)) = s((x+ y) + z) (5)
to which the induction hypothesis can be applied.
CLM ' s preconditions and effects of methods allow to plan (to
reason about) the application of tactics not just by “precondition
achievement” but supported by the meta-level control provided by
rippling. In CLAM a proof plan is then built as a tree of methods
by searching the plan-space.
Due to the urgently needed search control in theorem proving, proof
planning became more popular recently. Apart from the systemCLAM ,
other experiments explore different ways to realize proof planning.
For instance, the proof planner of Omega [11] performs state-space
search. As opposed to CLAM , it prefers more declaratively repre-
sented methods the output of which is determined by the input. Those
methods can be subject to reformulations. The method representation
in Omega allows for different level of goals which naturally leads to
hierarchical planning.
The fact that proof plans are an abstract and structured representa-
tion of proofs makes proof planning and, in particular, proof plans
attractive for other activities in theorem proving:
 The abstract and structured representation is well-suited for theo-
rem proving by analogy, as shown in [17]. The structure of a proof
plan can be exploited when analogically transferring methods and
subplans.As opposed to analogy at an abstract level, the analogical
transfer often fails if drawn at the low level of logical inference
rules.
 For derivational analogy [5, 24, 17], proof plans that store control
information are needed.
 Proof plans that store control information are also well-suited for
the explanation of proofs and for user interaction as, e.g., pursued
in Barnacle [16], an interactive version of CLAM . There, explana-
tions are extracted from the preconditions of CLAM ' s methods.
 As demonstrated in [15], a structured presentation of a proof has
proved very important for the human understanding of proofs and
is, therefore, needed for proof presentation and interactive theorem
proving.
3 Properties of Proof Planning
Proof planning is a specific plan formation in the “precondition
achievement” sense of AI-planning, and as an experiment the au-
thor has implemented a simple theorem proving domain in Prodigy.
Specific characteristics of this “domain” are:
 The objects are (mathematical) objects such as numbers, lists, or
trees and actions are manipulations of formulas describing objects
and their relations and functions.
 Formal mathematical proofs which theorem proving aims at, are
often long and very complex and even proof plans can be very deep.
Therefore the need to represent bigger chunks by a planning op-
erator and to understand a proof plan as an abstract representation
of a proof.
 Goal interaction which is a major issue for plan formation in
general and led to the development of partial order planning [21,
20]. In proof planning there is no goal interaction in the original
object-level sense because the application of a sequence of logical
inference rules does not destroy object-level preconditions.
 The acquisition of methods and of control knowledge for mathe-
matical domains is difficult. It took, for instance, quite some time
to polish CLAM ' s methods that at first simulated procedures from
the Nqthm theorem prover. Now CLAM gets a long way with few
methods for planning inductive proofs. We expect the acquisition
of control knowledge and methods to be a major research problem
for mathematical domains.
 In proof planning, the knowledge about the mathematical world
is complete and certain rather than incomplete and uncertain as in
many real world applications of planning.
4 Lessons from Planning and Proof Planning
As Weld [25] summarizes, in planning, knowledge-based search via
a miniature production system turned out to be a good idea. Usually,
these rules refer to local decisions. They can, however, also express
control knowledge referring to the global development of a plan.
First, in SOAR [14] such a control was explored and in the Prodigy
system [18] the ideas were refined. Such a control is also described in
[1]. Meta-level control-rules can be found in Press [4]. In Prodigy the
control-rules contain meta-predicates that refer to the current state,
the sequence of operators, etc. The experiences with a separate body
of control-rules in Prodigy are summarized in [23]: The advantage of
the factual-control knowledge distinction are modularity, reification
of the control knowledge, selectivity in building learning modules,
and compositionality of the acquired control knowledge. In SOAR
and Prodigy matching algorithms and data structures have been de-
veloped to cope efficiently with many control-rules (see [7]). These
experiences can help to design proof planning systems that make use
of the advantages mentioned.
Currently, the most interesting feature of proof planning that could
fertilize planning seems to be that abstract goals are pursued by heuris-
tics expressed in a meta-language. In particular, the abstract control
knowledge might be of interest for planning in real environments.
The design of meta-predicates that capture proof-relevant abstrac-
tions, e.g., those involved in rippling, gives an additional means of
control and thus, adds to the power of the proof planner. Thereby
proof planning becomes more than pure precondition achievement.
Macro-operators as investigated in [13] are a first step towards plan
patterns and therefore of interest for proof planning. They correspond
to fixed patterns of (sub)plans. For proof planning, however, we need
to find even more flexible patterns in order to structure a proof as the
experience with proofs by mathematical induction shows. In CLAM ,
an iteration over several submethods can provide a flexible pattern
represented by a supermethod. This idea might help in planning to
obtain plan patterns/macros that can be expanded flexibly.
Some clever hierarchical planning is needed in proof planning. So far,
two different techniques for hierarchical planning are used. CLAM
realizes hierarchical planning by flexibly expanding (super)methods
to a sequence of (sub)methods from a subset of methods. The output
of a super-method is determined by applying the submethods. In
Omega hierarchical planning is realized by explicitly marking less
relevant proof obligations (subgoals) that can be planned for in the
next lower hierarchical level. This will be amended by meta-level
criteria for distingishing the hierarchy levels.
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